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THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS
The conventional elements of disarmament and demobilization are usually short-term processes aimed at establishing the necessary security to consolidate negotiated settlements.
Disarmament programmes focus on the collection or confiscation of small arms and light weaponry from armed groups, and can include complementary programmes for collecting weapons from civilians. These initiatives can be direct or indirect depending on the local culture and context.
Disarmament and consolidating peace
The DDR process is targeted at strengthening the security of the country, of communities and individuals, through the reduction of armed forces and the demilitarization of society. Many DDR programmes include strategies to tackle the wider diffusion of arms in the post-conflict environment, putting arms and ammunition out of use through their collection, disposal and destruction.
The destruction of arms and ammunition can have a have a strong symbolic value depending on the specific cultural and social context. For example, although carried out to an extent, the dismantling of arms in Northern Ireland and Nepal has been more symbolic than real as many weapons still remain in circulation.
The success of disarmament processes depend on various contextual factors such as: i) both combatants and communities feeling secure; ii) the commitment of political leadership and the use of disarmament as leverage in negotiations; iii) the role firearms play in the local culture; iv) the use of firearms as a means of earning a living (for example in order to protect livestock); v) the existence of arms and ammunition in regional arms markets (legal and illegal); iv) the security of arms and munitions stocks amongst other factors.
Disarmament programmes can be compulsory or cooperative. Compulsory programmes use official and legal instruments, military operations or punitive measures and are generally carried out by national governments. This approach has attracted some criticism from human rights activists in some cases such as Uganda and Southern Sudan where these programmes have resulted in abuses such as murder, rape, community displacement and looting.
National governments also develop other mechanisms to encourage the disarmament of combatants and societies such as ‘arms amnesties´. In this situation disarmament can be linked to legislation on small arms. In South Africa in 2005, the population could hand in those arms that had become illegal under the legislation controlling firearms. A similar process was carried out in Angola in 2008 where arms were handed in as part of the ‘National Campaign for the Disarmament of Persons in Possession of Firearms.’
Voluntary or cooperative disarmament programmes require incentives with the aim of persuading former combatants to surrender their weapons. ‘Arms for development’ programmes, which have been implemented in Bosnia, Albania, Mali and Nigeria are examples of cooperative programmes.
Focusing on development as an incentive for disarmament is also aimed at the receptor communities, intending to create a climate of cooperation between combatants, communities and the agencies overseeing the programme. In Liberia, for example, communities choose which type of development project will be implemented.
Arms lotteries are an example of ‘second generation´cooperative programmes. These have been carried out in Haiti, Mozambique, the Republic of Congo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), but have not been immune to criticism either. Some analysts have asserted that these programmes can be wrongly perceived by the community as a way of compensating criminals. In addition, they can appear ineffective in situations where a culture of weapons ownership exists.
Money can provide another incentive in voluntary programs. However, programs to ‘buy’ arms can produce various negative effects on the market. Money can in fact stimulate illegal arms trading with weapons being stolen from stockpiles in order to receive financial benefits from handing them in to a DDR programme depending on the amount received for each weapon.
Colombia can bear witness from its own experience that security derived from democracy, investor confidence and social cohesion are factors in our country which have enabled huge reintegration and peacebuilding. We view investment as a social duty linked to the success of our objectives for the country as a whole. We understand that social cohesion is connected to security. Without security there is no investment, and without investment we cannot make further steps to tackle poverty.
In Colombia, we are choosing to confront violence without violating democratic principles, a policy which is yielding important results. To date, whilst hostilities remain with illegal armed groups which threaten our democracy, more than 51,000 members of illegal armed groups have been demobilized.
More than 31,000 of these were the result of peace negotiations held with illegal paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. The remaining 20,000 have been the result of individual demobilizations in which members of groups which have not entered into dialogue with the government have opted to return to civilian life even though their leaders are not seeking peace. More than 13,000 countrymen and women have left the narcoterrorist group, the FARC, in this manner.